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RESTORING ACCESS TO THE ADVANCEMENT
OF DEFENSE COSTS FOR WHITE-COLLAR
DEFENDANTS: THE INADEQUACIES OF THE
MCNULTY MEMO
I. WHITE-COLLAR CRIME, ADVANCEMENT OF DEFENSE COSTS, DOJ
POLICY, AND PROPOSED LEGISLATION-THE FRAMEWORK FOR THE
CONTROVERSY

Recently, in what has been described as the "largest tax fraud case in
United States history,"' seventeen partners from the global accounting
giant KPMG and two other individuals affiliated with the firm were
indicted on charges relating to the creation of illegal tax shelters.2
During the investigation and in pretrial proceedings, the nineteen
defendants and the company confronted the full force of the federal
government's prosecutorial powers.
Specifically, before ever reaching trial, the government had taken
335 depositions, examined 195 federal tax returns,' and produced over
22 million pages of electronic and tangible documents for discovery.4
Additionally, a prosecution team that included personnel from
numerous government agencies, including the United States Attorney's
Office, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the United States Postal
Inspection Service, and the government's forensic accounting experts,
overwhelmed the individual defendants and their representatives
Moreover, just as in any case of such magnitude, the costs of raising an
individual defense became enormous; in fact, each defendant expended
1. United States v. Stein (Stein 11), 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 362 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
2. United States v. Stein (Stein 1), 410 F. Supp. 2d 316, 318 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
3. Stein 11, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 362.
4. United States v. Stein (Stein IV), 495 F. Supp. 2d 390,407 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
5. Paul Davies & David Reilly, In KPMG Case, the Thorny Issue of Legal Fees, WALL
ST. J., June 12, 2007, at C5 (describing one defendant's counsel as being from a small, threelawyer firm); see also United States v. Stein (Stein 111), 461 F. Supp. 2d 201, 203 (S.D.N.Y.
2006) (quoting another defendant's attorney as saying, "I don't have anything.... I have no
staff. I'm basically by myself. The case has gotten longer and longer and more and more
complex and more and more and more documents. And without relief in the fee case, I really
don't know that I'll even be able to stay in this case, although I can tell you that I've tried
everything humanly possible to do that and not to make an application like that [i.e., to be
relieved], for many obvious reasons.") (insertion in original).
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an average of $1.7 million in pretrial defense costs.'
While the practical and financial landscapes confronted by the

defendants in this case were quite daunting, such factual scenarios have,
unfortunately, become increasingly common for individuals facing
investigation or indictment for highly complex, white-collar criminal
activity.7 Generally, however, the disadvantages with which individual

defendants contend during prosecution of white-collar crimes have
traditionally been mitigated by their organization's provision of legal
defense costs through indemnification and advancement policies found

in the organization's charter or bylaws and in various state statutory
schemes.8
In particular, advancing defense costs to individuals facing criminal

indictment or investigation for matters relating to their employment
ensures them the financial means necessary to raise an adequate defense
in a case that is likely to cost at least $100,000. 9 Without such assistance,
defendants must expend huge sums of personal assets, sometimes
depleting their entire net worth,"° defending highly complex, sometimes
6. See infra note 10.
7. See, e.g., Greg Burns, Top Dollar Defense Is Often No Bargain: Black Latest to Lose
Case Despite Having a Legal Dream Team, CHI. TRIB., July 15, 2007, at C1 (quoting a
Chicago corporate defense attorney, Ronald Safer, as saying that "[t]here are hundreds of
millions of pages of documents" and that the sheer number of documents produced is the
most daunting aspect of a modern corporate criminal defense); Steve Fry, Lake's Attorneys
Are Owed Millions, THE TOPEKA CAP.-J. (Topeka, Kan.), May 30, 2007, at Al (stating that
Douglas Lake, a former senior executive for Westar Energy, spent $15 million on his whitecollar defense and had over $4 million in outstanding bills); Jennifer Levitz, Kozlowski Seeks
Reimbursement, WALL ST. J., June 5, 2006, at C3 (recognizing that Tyco's former CEO,
Dennis Kozlowski, was seeking a total reimbursement of $17.8 million from an insurer for his
first white-collar criminal defense).
8. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145 (2001 & Supp. 2006); MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT
§§ 8.50-.56 (2005); Stein II, 435 F. Supp. 2d, at 354-55. Indemnification pertains to when the
organization compensates an individual defendant for costs expended in a successful criminal
defense arising out of the defendant's employment, whereas, advancement pertains to when
the organization provides funds to an individual defendant for the defense costs as they arise
and requires repayment only if the defendant is found guilty of the crime. See Stein H, 435 F.
Supp. 2d at 354-55; see also tit. 8, § 145; MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr §§ 8.50-56 (2005).
9. See Nathan Koppel, U.S. Pressures Firms Not to Pay Staff Legal Fees, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 28, 2006, at B1.
10. For example, in Stein II, the court made an early estimate that the cost of having a
privately retained lawyer simply attend the trial proceedings would cost more than $375,000
for each defendant. Stein II, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 362 n.163. Later, the court explained the
defendants' financial positions as the following:
The Court, in ruling on another motion, has found that Mr. Hasting is
insolvent. Mr. Watson has assets of approximately $80,000, owes his
lawyers approximately $1 million, and has no regular source of income.
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ambiguous" charges arising from their employment before culpability is
ever established. 12
Consequently, advancing defense costs to
management-level employees has become standard practice in modernday corporate America. 3
However, in the wake of several high-profile corporate scandals that
took place during the first few years of this decade," the Department of
Justice (DOJ) shifted its organizational charging policy and began to
exert significant pressure upon organizations that advanced defense
costs to indicted employees for white-collar crimes.'5 Under the revised
policy, if organizations advanced defense costs to indicted employees,
then the DOJ would label the organization as uncooperative and an
indictment against the company would likely follow.'6 As a result,
because an indictment is so detrimental to the continued viability of an
organization," most organizations acquiesced to the DOJ's demands and
left their former employees to defend themselves, 8 with only their
personal resources available to cover the defense costs.'
Following the revision, the DOJ came under fire from the courts, the

Mr. Bickham has remaining assets of less than $300,000, owes his lawyers
over $600,000, and is threatened by his attorneys with a motion for leave
to withdraw. . . . None of them can afford to defend this case at any
meaningful level.
The other ten defendants ... are in better financial circumstances.
Their net assets range from something less than $1 million to something
more than $5 million, with most being in the $1 to $3 million range....
. . . [T]he fees and expenses, paid and unpaid, that they have
incurred to date.., range from a low of around $500,000 to a high of $3.6
million. They average roughly $1,700,000 per defendant so far. And the
most expensive part of the case-a six to eight month trial-lies ahead.
United States v. Stein (Stein IV), 495 F. Supp. 2d 390, 423-24 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (citations
omitted).
11. See infra note 55 (recognizing that the boundaries of white-collar criminal actions
are not always clearly established).
12. See infra text accompanying note 87.
13. See 3A WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF
PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 1344.10 (2002); see also Dale A. Oesterle, Limits on a
Corporation'sProtection of Its Directors and Officers from Personal Liability, 1983 WIS. L.
REV. 513, 536-38.

14. See infra note 36.
15. See Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, U.S. Deputy Attorney General, to All
Component Heads and United States Attorneys, at Preface (Jan. 20, 2003), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/corporate__guidelines.htm [hereinafter Thompson Memo].
16. See infra Part II.C.1.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 31-32, 61.
18. See infra Part II.C.2.a-b.
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media, and the business community, 9 all of whom argued that the
revised advancement policy was unfair to individual defendants because
it altered the landscape too drastically in the government's favor.' In
particular, United States District Court Judge Lewis Kaplan recently
issued a decision finding the DOJ's application of its advancement
policy to be an unconstitutional infringement upon the defendants' right
to a fair trial and their right to representation of their choosing, free of
unreasonable government interference.2' In addition, Senator Arlen
Specter introduced the Attorney-Client Privilege Act of 2006resubmitted by Specter and introduced in the House as the AttorneyClient Privilege Act of 2007 22-which eliminates the consideration of
advancement payments from the government's charging decision
altogether.23
In light of such criticism, the DOJ reluctantly revised its
advancement policy again, but it did not completely remove
advancement from the prosecutors' considerations when determining
whether to indict an organization.24 Instead, at any point in any
investigation, the prosecution can properly elicit information pertaining
to the source of an individual's defense funds, and in limited
circumstances, advancement remains a legitimate prosecutorial
consideration in the charging determination.25 As a result, traditional
organizational advancement policies and the benefits they provide
individuals charged with white-collar crimes continue to be threatened
and unjustly infringed upon by the DOJ's organizational charging policy
regarding advancement.
Consequently, it is time for Congress to act and restore full
protections to the advancement of defense costs for employees who
have been indicted for white-collar criminal violations. The AttorneyClient Privilege Act of 2007 provides these necessary protections for
advancement by removing the issue completely from prosecutorial

19. See generally infra Part III.A.
20. See generally infra Part II.C.2.
21. See United States v. Stein (Stein If), 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 360-69, 382 (S.D.N.Y.
2006); see also infra Part II.C.2.e.

22. S. 186, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 3013, 110th Cong. (2007).
23. S. 30, 109th Cong. § 3 (2006); see also infra Part IV.A.
24. See Memorandum from Paul J. McNulty, U.S. Deputy Attorney General, to Heads
of Department Components and United States Attorneys (Dec. 12, 2006), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/speeches/2006/mcnulty-memo.pdf [hereinafter McNulty Memo];
see also infra Part Il.

25. See McNulty Memo, supra note 24, at pt. VII.B.3; see also infra Part III.B.3.

2007]

RESTORING ACCESS TO ADVANCEMENT

consideration when determining whether to indict an organization."
Furthermore, enacting the legislation will create a stable and reliable
policy in regards to advancement that can be changed only with further
legislative action." Finally, the legislation applies to all federal agents,
as opposed to DOJ personnel alone, thereby providing broader
protections for white-collar defendants and their organizations.28
Therefore, because the proposed legislation makes several significant
improvements to the DOJ's current advancement policy without
sacrificing the ability of prosecutors to discover and punish criminal
actions, 29 the advancement provisions of the Attorney-Client Privilege
Protection Act of 2007 should be enacted in the current legislative
session.
This Comment argues that the current DOJ advancement policy,
although recently modified, continues to be problematic for individual
defendants and organizations. It also provides justification for why the
recently proposed advancement provisions in the Attorney-Client
Privilege Act of 2007 should be enacted to restore traditional rights of
access to advancement payments for employees.
Specifically, Part II begins with a brief run-up to the DOJ's creation
of its first organizational charging policy in 1999, the Holder Memo
(Part II.A). Part II continues by examining (Part II.B) and critiquing
(Part II.C) the DOJ's revised advancement policy as set forth by the
Thompson Memo in 2003. Additionally, Part II contains a summary of
the recently dismissed KPMG tax case, which provides a superb case
study for how the DOJ's advancement policy was applied in practice
under the Thompson Memo and the problems the policy created (Part
II.C.2.e.i).
Next, Part III examines the motivations for (Part III.A) and explores
the substance of (Part III.B) the DOJ's most recent revision to its
advancement policy found in the McNulty Memo. In particular, Part
III.C shows why the McNulty Memo revisions are inadequate and how
they fail to protect traditional employee rights and access to
advancement payments.
Then, Part IV discusses the advancement provisions proposed in the
Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2007 and how removing
advancement from prosecutorial consideration in the organizational

26.
27.
28.
29.

S. 186, 110th Cong. § 3(b)(2)(B) (2007); H.R. 3013, 110th Cong. § 3(b)(2)(B) (2007).
See infra Part IV.B.1-2.
See infra Part IV.B.3.
See infra Part IV.B.
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charging decision is an improvement for both employees and
organizations faced with a federal indictment or investigation.
Finally, Part V provides a brief summary and conclusion for why the
advancement provisions in the Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act
of 2007 should be enacted.
II. THE THOMPSON MEMO: BEGINNING THE CONTROVERSY
This Part summarizes the lead-up to the promulgation of the
Thompson Memo and its advancement policy. After describing the
policy, several criticisms are presented. The criticisms are illustrated by
the recently dismissed KPMG tax-shelter case, where the Thompson
Memo was utilized by the DOJ to force the company to cut off
advancement payments, despite the company's tradition of providing
such payments.
A. The Lead-up to the Thompson Memo
Before 1999, the DOJ did not have a uniform charging policy for
prosecutors to reference when determining whether to indict an
organization. 30
The lack of a uniform policy was a significant
shortcoming for the DOJ and for companies faced with the possibility of
indictment because a company's indictment usually carries with it a
"virtual death sentence, 31 for the business.32 Therefore, in June 1999,
30. Christopher A. Wray & Robert K. Hur, Corporate CriminalProsecution in a PostEnron World: The Thompson Memo in Theory and Practice,43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1095, 1099
(2006). The DOJ did have its "Principles of Federal Prosecution" to aid in its determination
of whether to pursue an entity's indictment, but these principles apply to all prosecutions and
do not account for special considerations involved with indicting an organization. Id. at 1099
n.18. Mr. Christopher Wray was Deputy Attorney General Thompson's Associate Deputy
Attorney General at the DOJ when the Thompson Memo was promulgated. See Thompson
Memo, supra note 15, at Preface. In fact, Mr. Wray appears to have been heavily involved
with the creation of the Memo, as evidenced by its explicit statement that any comments
regarding the substance of the Memo should be forwarded to him. Id.
31. Wray & Hur, supra note 30, at 1097.
32. For example, the ninety-year-old accounting giant Arthur Andersen L.L.P.
"implode[d]" after its 2002 company indictment concerning obstruction of justice charges
related to Andersen's role in the Enron debacle. George Ellard, Making the Silent Speak and
the Informed Wary, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 985, 987 (2005). In fact, "[b]y the time the
company was convicted [a conviction that was later overturned], it had, essentially, ceased to
exist." Earl J. Silbert & Demme Doufekias Joannou, Under Pressure to Catch the Crooks:
The Impact of Corporate Privilege Waivers on the AdversarialSystem, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
1225, 1229 (2006). In addition, it is worth noting that financial services firms, accounting
firms, and other firms that rely on their public reputation and perceived trustworthiness are
impacted disproportionately by an indictment. With such firms, "[tirial is unnecessary; the
damage is done with the indictment." Dale A. Oesterle, Early Observations on the

2007]

RESTORING ACCESS TO ADVANCEMENT

Eric H. Holder, then the U.S. Deputy Attorney General, issued a policy

memorandum (Holder Memo) identifying eight factors for prosecutors
to consider when making a decision on whether to indict a company.33
Stated broadly, the eight factors of consideration in the Holder
Memo included matters relating to the company's immediate actions,
the company's propensity to commit such actions, the company's
remedial and cooperation efforts, and the company's collateral
consequences that may arise from a prosecution.
Practically, the
Holder Memo was simply an effort by the DOJ to promulgate more

uniform criteria for prosecutors to consider when determining whether
to indict an organization; conceivably, this guidance allowed business

managers to organize their operations with greater certainty of avoiding
possible criminal liability against the organization."
However, following the wave of unprecedented corporate scandals
in 2002, the DOJ decided that the Holder Memo was in need of a
tactical adjustment.36 The adjustment came on January 20, 2003, by way
of a memorandum from then Deputy Attorney General Larry D.
Prosecutions of the Business Scandals of 2002-03: On Sideshow Prosecutions, Spitzer's Clash
with Donaldson over Turf the Choice of Civil or Criminal Actions, and the Tough Tactic of
Coerced Cooperation, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 443, 472 (2004); see also Timothy P. Harkness &
Carmel E. Gabbay, U.S. v. Stein: Rewriting the Rules of Corporate Cooperation with
Government Investigations, 14 METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNS., Aug. 2006, at 19, 19 ("No
major financial services firm has ever survived a criminal indictment.").
33. Memorandum from Eric H. Holder, U.S. Deputy Attorney General, to All
Component Heads and United States Attorneys (June 16, 1999), available at http://www.
usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/docs/reports/1999/chargingcorps.html [hereinafter Holder Memo].
34. Id. The specific factors were the following: (1) "[t]he nature and seriousness of the
offense"; (2) "[t]he pervasiveness of wrongdoing within the corporation"; (3) "[t]he
corporation's history of similar conduct"; (4) "[t]he corporation's timely and voluntary
disclosure of wrongdoing and its willingness to cooperate . . .including, if necessary, the
waiver of the corporate attorney-client and work product privileges"; (5) "[t]he existence and
adequacy of the corporation's compliance program"; (6) "[t]he corporation's remedial
actions"; (7) "[c]ollateral consequences" arising from prosecution; and (8) "[t]he adequacy of
non-criminal remedies." Id.
35. See interview by Lori Calabro with Paul McNulty, U.S. Deputy Attorney General
(Sept. 2006), available at http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/7851821/c_7873404?f=magazine
alsoinside (quoting McNulty as saying that the Thompson Memo, a revision of the Holder
Memo, "was an effort to try to guide [prosecutorial] discretion"); see also Lynnley Browning,
Justice Department Is Reviewing Corporate Prosecution Guidelines, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13,
2006, at C3 (quoting McNulty as saying, "The irony of the attacks on the Thompson memo is
that the federal criminal justice system would be a much harsher, less predictable and less
transparent environment for corporations and their counsel in the absence of this guidance.").
36. In 2002, a record number of companies restated their earnings and caused a record
number of public companies to enter bankruptcy, which ultimately led to a widespread loss of
capital for individuals. Oesterle, supra note 32, at 443. As one notable commentator stated,
"[T]he size of the 2002 debacle dwarf[ed] many earlier ones." Id. at 445.
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Thompson (Thompson Memo).37
The Thompson Memo was basically a recitation of the provisions in
the Holder Memo38 with only a few slight changes. 9 However, the
Thompson Memo highlighted the changes made to the DOJ policy by
explaining that "[t]he main focus of the revisions is increased emphasis
'
on and scrutiny of the authenticity of a corporation's cooperation." 40
B. Cooperation(and Capitulation)Under the Thompson Memo

1. The Thompson Memo's Cooperation Demands
The Thompson Memo outlined three general issues for prosecutors
to consider when determining whether a particular organization was
cooperating with an investigation.4 ' First, the company's disclosures had
to be complete, including if necessary, waiving the attorney-client and
work product privileges. 2 Second, the organization could not "appear[]
to be protecting its culpable employees and agents" by advancing them
attorney fees, by providing them with information from the government
about the investigation, or by retaining their services without sanction.43
Finally, the company could not engage in actions that impeded an
investigation, while at the same time purporting to be cooperative.' For
example, an organization could not make overly broad or incomplete
assertions that would likely mislead the investigation.
More specifically, the determination of whether a company was
cooperating in an investigation would vary in each case depending on
37. Thompson Memo, supra note 15.
38. Carmen Couden, Note, The Thompson Memorandum: A Revised Solution or Just a
Problem?, 30 J. CORP. L. 405, 413 (2005).
39. The Thompson Memo changed the policy in the following ways: (1) by stating
explicitly that "[t]he nature and seriousness of the offense may be such as to warrant
prosecution regardless of the other factors"; (2) by giving closer scrutiny to corporate
compliance programs; (3) by instructing prosecutors to assess the company's cooperation
more closely; and (4) by adding a ninth factor for prosecutors to consider-"the adequacy of
the prosecution of individuals responsible for the corporation's malfeasance." See Thompson
Memo, supra note 15, at pts. II.A.8, II.B, VI, VII; see also Couden, supra note 38, at 413-14
(citing the differences in the Holder Memo and the Thompson Memo).
40. Thompson Memo, supra note 15, at Preface.
41. See id. at pt. VI.B.
42. Id. The government argued that the waiver of privileges is "often critical in enabling
the government to evaluate the completeness of a corporation's voluntary disclosure and
cooperation." Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.

45. Id.
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the facts relevant to the Thompson Memo provisions and on the
interplay amongst the Thompson Memo's nine

46
16

factors.

Some

examples of actions taken by organizations acting cooperatively under
the Thompson

Memo guidelines include

the following:

making

employees available to testify as witnesses without subpoenas,
terminating employees who were accountable for the underlying
conduct and employees who refused to cooperate with the investigation,
sharing records and data gathered during the company's internal
investigations with the prosecution, despite claims of privilege, and
agreeing to use outside professionals, such as accountants and lawyers,

who were recommended by the government to evaluate the company's
current operations.4
2. The DOJ's Defense of Its Reinvigorated Cooperation Policy
Due to the difficulties that usually accompany the investigation of an

organization, the DOJ deems an organization's cooperation to be an
important factor in determining whether to pursue an indictment.4 9' The
DOJ defends this policy by arguing that the government has finite

resources to spend on any given investigation, so it makes sense for it to
incentivize companies to cooperate by giving them benefits in the
charging decision for doing so.' By using organizations' formidable
resources to supplement what the government has available, the
efficiency and effectiveness of government investigations increases."
Additionally, the DOJ argues that a company's cooperation in a
particular investigation is a voluntary decision and that the Thompson
Memo did not require organizations "to do anything [that was] not in
their business interest to do., 52 Furthermore, Mr. Thompson, and
46. The nine factors included the eight factors carried forward from the Holder Memo,
see Holder Memo, supra note 33; see also supra note 34, and the addition of the ninth factor
considering the "adequacy of the prosecution of individuals responsible" for the
organization's actions, see Thompson Memo, supra note 15; see also Holder Memo, supra
note 33; supra note 39.
47. Wray & Hur, supra note 30, at 1135-36.
48. Id. at 1136.
49. Because a company is an artificial entity, it is often difficult to identify the
responsible party for the criminal actions imputed to an organization, and because companies
are not generally situated in only one location, the gathering and compiling of witnesses,
documents, and other records may be difficult due to their geographic dispersion. McNulty
Memo, supra note 24, at pt. VII.B; Thompson Memo, supra note 15, at pt. VIB; see also
Couden, supra note 38, at 411.
50. Wray & Hur, supra note 30, at 1170.
51. Id. at 1170-71.
52. Stephanie Kirchgaessner, Hardline Justice Department Starts to Feel the Heat. A
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presumptively others at the DOJ, has previously proclaimed, "[I]t is
always in the corporation's interest to cooperate fully with the
government so that matters under investigation can be resolved as
quickly and fairly as possible."53
Therefore, the DOJ defended its cooperation policy under the

Thompson Memo by arguing that it was not compelling organizations to
do anything, but rather, it was providing them an opportunity to avoid
the detriments of an indictment through voluntary cooperation. 4
3. Complaints Regarding Thompson-Style Cooperation
Despite the DOJ's rationale, the Thompson Memo's increased focus

From the business
on cooperation was highly controversial.
risk because it may
is
a
significant
community's perspective, cooperation

subject the company and its employees55 to additional criminal liability. 6
Therefore, in order for that risk to be worth the reward of possibly

avoiding an indictment, organizations must perceive the government to
be fair and consistent in its determination of what constitutes
cooperation;

in other words, organizations must not feel like the

government has become too demanding or over-aggressive in its pursuit
of cooperation. 8 Otherwise, organizations may begin to see fewer
Recent Ruling That It Violated the Constitution Has Added to Pressureon the DOJ to Soften
Its Tactics, FIN. TIMES (London), Aug. 2, 2006, at 2.
53. Larry D. Thompson, "Zero Tolerance" for Corporate Fraud,WALL ST. J., July 21,
2003, at A1O. The assumption is that, all else equal, a quick investigation and resolution is
better for the company, regardless of the outcome, because responding to an investigation
diverts company resources and focus away from operating the business. See id.
54. Couden, supra note 38, at 410; Wray & Hur, supra note 30, at 1171.
55. Sometimes it is argued that only witnesses who have committed crimes should be
reluctant to cooperate with investigators. For example, in an interview with the Wall Street
Journal,Thompson said, "[I]f employees really don't believe they acted with criminal intent,
'they don't need fancy legal representation' to defend themselves." N. Richard Janis, Is
Justice at Risk? Company Counsel as Federal Agents, 15 N.J. LAW., Feb. 20, 2006, at A3.
However, this line of reasoning overlooks the important fact that the boundaries of whitecollar criminal liability are not always so clear as to what practices are illegal. In addition,
white-collar indictments "often represent developments in criminal law," so defendants could
unknowingly be subjected to criminal liability while abiding by their normal employment
practices and procedures. Ellard, supra note 32, at 989.
56. Wray & Hur, supra note 30, at 1171. In addition to possible criminal liability, the
costs associated with cooperating are significant and may include civil liability stemming from
the organization's cooperation efforts, such as terminating employees, disclosing confidential
documents, and waiving certain privileges. Michael A. Simons, Vicarious Snitching: Crime,
Cooperation,and "Good CorporateCitizenship," 76 ST.JOHN'S L. REV. 979, 981 (2002).
57. Wray & Hur, supra note 30, at 1171.
58. Id.
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advantages in their strategies of cooperation and choose to stonewall
when interacting with the investigative authorities.
However, the major criticism59 of the government's increased
emphasis on cooperation under the Thompson Memo was that it gave
prosecutors too much discretionary power, which in fact did enable
them to be overly demanding and aggressive in their cooperation
demands.' The argument was that when a prosecutor threatened to
indict a company, she was threatening the company's future viability as
well.6" Therefore, a company faced with a possible criminal indictment62
had no bargaining power, and its only practical strategy was to abide
with the government's heavy demands for cooperation.63
In fact, one commentator noted that an organization's best bet in
avoiding an indictment during the Thompson Memo era was to
undertake "super cooperation" and make an immediate change in top
management personnel. 64 Another commentator stated similarly that, in
terms of financial services companies, 65 "[tiotal capitulation to
59. A somewhat more theoretical criticism of the Thompson Memo is that, because it
was an internal DOJ policy, the entire document was implemented by the DOJ unilaterally
and did not undergo any formal rule-making or legislative processes.
Therefore,
organizations were forced to live with the provisions of the Memo, essentially as law, without
the provisions being subjected to any democratic scrutiny. See Harkness & Gabbay, supra
note 32, at 19.
60. Ellard, supra note 32, at 993; see also Wray & Hur, supra note 30, at 1170-71.
61. Oesterle, supra note 32, at 473. The viability of a company is threatened by
indictment because an indictment of a company is a "virtual death sentence." Wray & Hur,
supra note 30, at 1097; see also supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
62. However, if an organization believed that "the possibility of a criminal conviction
[was] only marginally less attractive than" the extreme level of cooperation it was required to
provide, then the organization would not have cooperated because the burden of doing so
was nearly equal to the burden associated with being indicted. See Wray & Hur, supra note
30, at 1171. While avoiding indictment is likely the ultimate objective for a company under
governmental investigation, the impact of the company's decision to cooperate with the
government can be detrimental for the company itself because many times when employees
are fired, they disclose privileged communications, and they are forced to cooperate with
investigators to keep their jobs. See Simons, supra note 56, at 997-98. This results in lower
company morale and lower employee confidence in the organization. Id. at 998.
63. Oesterle, supra note 32, at 473-74, 476.
64. Simons, supra note 56, at 1017. Additionally, James Comey, Thompson's successor
at the DOJ, said that in his view, "for a corporation to get credit for cooperation, it must help
the Government catch the crooks." Janis, supra note 55 (emphasis added); see also Silbert &
Joannou, supra note 32, at 1229 (quoting Christopher A. Wray, then the U.S. Assistant
Attorney General, as saying, "[I]f you want to ensure that credit [for cooperation], your
cooperation needs to be authentic: you have to get all the way on board and do your best to
assist the government.") (emphasis added).
65. See supra text accompanying note 32 (discussing the extra burden an indictment
brings financial services companies).
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prosecutors by companies under threat of criminal sanction may be the
only real business strategy left . . . ."66 Essentially, the Thompson
Memo's cooperation policy put "[t]he firm's life . .. in the hands and

discretion of a prosecutor," and that policy enabled the government to
impose very burdensome demands on the company.67
One of the most burdensome and controversial provisions in the
Thompson

Memo's section

on cooperation

strongly discouraged

organizations from advancing defense costs to its employees under
investigation or indictment for work-related criminal activities. 6 The

DOJ's enforcement of this provision raised significant criticism because
many saw the practice as unreasonable and unjustifiable government
interference with many white-collar defendants' rights and abilities to
obtain representation of their choosing using all funds available to them.
C. Cutting off Advancement and the Problems Created
1. The DOJ's Policy Rationale for Discouraging Advancement
Specifically,

the

Thompson

Memo

organization should not "appear[]

stated

that

a

business

to be protecting its culpable

employees and agents" by undertaking the advancement of attorneys'
fees to its workers who are under investigation or indictment.69 The
DOJ argued that advancing defense costs to employees under
investigation or indictment was a "'breach of fiduciary duty [by the

company] to the shareholders' and a 'misuse of shareholders' assets."' 7
66. Oesterle, supra note 32, at 475.
67. Id. at 476.
68. Jeremy Harrell, Memo Echoes in Milberg Weiss Indictment, LONG ISLAND Bus.
NEWS, May 26, 2006, at Commentary. The provision on waiving attorney-client privileges
was probably equally controversial. Id.
69. Thompson Memo, supra note 15, at pt. VI.B.
70. Janis, supra note 55. However, the suggestion that the DOJ is truly concerned with
the "'misuse of shareholders' assets"' appears questionable due to the substantial financial
settlement agreements the department frequently requires from companies. Id.; see, e.g.,
infra note 118 (showing the KPMG settlement with the government to include a $456 million
fine). Many corporate boards believe these settlements to be "wildly out of proportion to the
conduct alleged, and often are seen ...as an exorbitant cost of doing business, if not outright
extortion." Janis, supra note 55. Furthermore, the argument that advancing defense costs
would be a breach of the board's fiduciary duties does not generally carry much weight, at
least in the corporate context, because "[tihe exercise of directors' fiduciary duties cannot ...
permit them to evade the corporation's own by-laws." United States v. Weissman, No. S2 94
Cr. 760, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8540, at *52 (S.D.N.Y. June 16, 1997) (holding that a
corporate board's fiduciary duties to its shareholders do not permit it to revoke advancement
and indemnification rights granted to employees in the by-laws of the corporation).
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Therefore, during the Thompson Memo era, if a company chose to
advance defense costs to its employees without being legally bound to
do so, then the government would deem the company uncooperative
and an indictment would likely follow.7
2. Problems and Threats for Employees and Their Firms Under the
Thompson Memo Advancement Policy
However, the Thompson Memo policy on advancement of defense
costs runs counter to a long-established common-law principle that says,
"[I]f an agent has, without his own default, incurred losses or damages in

the course of transacting the business of his agency, or in following the2
instructions of his principal, he will be entitled to full compensation.
Although the common-law principle remains the same today, most

states have broadened it by enacting statutes that permit 73 organizations
to advance defense costs to employees under investigation or
indictment.74
Because the DOJ policy announced in the Thompson Memo was at
odds with many employees' traditional rights of indemnification and
advancement, the Memo and the DOJ received significant criticism for

making cooperation dependent upon the company's decision of whether
to make advancement payments. The most common criticisms are
summarized in this section.

71. See Silbert & Joannou, supra note 32, at 1238 (quoting Judge Lewis Kaplan as saying
that "if advancement of legal fees is not required by law, their advancement will be
considered a failure to cooperate. I mean, you don't have to be a rocket scientist to understand
that [Thompson] memorandum.") (emphasis added).
72. United States v. Stein (Stein 11), 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 353-54 (S.D.N.Y 2006)
(quoting JOSEPH STORY, STORY ON AGENCY § 339 (Charles P. Greenough ed., 1882)).
73. These statutes permit the organization to advance defense costs, but they do not
require such advancements. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(e) (2001) (stating that
expenses "may be paid by the corporation in advance") (emphasis added); MODEL Bus.
CORP. ACT § 8.53(a) (2005) ("A corporation may, before final disposition of a proceeding,
advance funds.") (emphasis added); Homestore, Inc. v. Tafeen, 888 A.2d 204, 218 (Del. 2005)
("No Delaware corporation is required to provide for advancement of expenses."). However,
most companies "do adopt advancement provisions as an inducement which promotes ...
attracting the most capable people into ... service." Id.
74. FLETCHER, supra note 13, § 1344.10; see, e.g., tit. 8, § 145(e); MODEL Bus. CORP.
ACT § 8.53(a) (2005). Advancement is conditional upon a successful defense, so if the
employee is convicted after receiving payments, then he must reimburse the company for the
payments made. See tit. 8, § 145(e); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.53(a)(2) (2005); FLETCHER,
supra note 13, § 1344.10.
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a. The Overwhelming FinancialBurden for Individual Defendants
Without the benefit of advancement payments, most individuals are
unable to afford an adequate defense for most white-collar criminal
charges.
The advancement of defense costs allows individuals
"immediate interim relief from the personal out-of-pocket financial
burden of paying the significant on-going expenses inevitably involved
with investigations and legal proceedings."" It is an important corollary
to indemnification rights because it "fills the gap76 . . . so the
The financial
[organization] may shoulder . . . interim costs.""
costs allow
by
the
advancement
of
defense
protections provided
defendants the "ability to mount .. . a defense . . .by safeguarding
[their] ability to meet [their] expenses at the time they arise, and to
secure counsel on the basis of such an assurance."78
On the other hand, if the company does not advance defense costs to
its employees, then there is a danger that they will receive inadequate
representation, or maybe no representation at all, considering most
white-collar defendants do not qualify for court-appointed counsel.7 9
b. The Dependence on Advancement Rights as an Employment Benefit
Furthermore, employees are dependent upon their employers to
provide indemnification and advancement payments as part of their

75. Homestore, 888 A.2d at 211.

76. The "gap" being referred to here is the gap of time from indictment to final
disposition where, without the benefit of advancement payments, an employee would be
responsible for providing her own defense costs. Indemnification does not become effective
until after final disposition, so without advancement rights, an employee is on her own during
the course of the litigation. Therefore, advancement of defense costs has become pivotal for
employees facing criminal charges arising from their jobs. See also supra notes 10-13 and

accompanying text.
77. Kaung v. Cole Nat'l Corp., 884 A.2d 500, 509 (Del. 2005).
78. United States v. Weissman, No. S2 94 Cr. 760, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8540, at *50
(S.D.N.Y. June 16, 1997).

79. See, e.g., supra note 7 (showing the defense attorney seeking an application for
withdrawal due to unpaid fees incurred in a white-collar defense costing nearly $18 million);
supra note 10 (showing the tremendous financial burden that white-collar defense can have
on individual defendants, even to the point of attorneys seeking permission to withdraw from
representation); see also United States v. Stein (Stein I1), 461 F. Supp. 2d 201, 203 (S.D.N.Y.

2006) (quoting one defendant's attorney as saying, "I don't have anything ....I have no staff.
I'm basically by myself. The case has gotten longer and longer and more and more complex
and more and more and more documents. And without relief in the fee case, I really don't
know that I'll even be able to stay in this case, although I can tell you that I've tried

everything humanly possible to do that and not to make an application like that [i.e., to be
relieved], for many obvious reasons.") (insertion in original).
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expected benefits of employment.'

Individual employees are especially

dependent upon advancement rights in today's work environment
because they are more vulnerable to federal indictment due to the
increasingly aggressive tactics used by the DOJ to combat corporate
crime.8 ' As a result, individuals have come to rely on advancement

rights just as much as8 2other employee benefits, such as health benefits or
retirement packages.
Consequently, by strongly discouraging advancement of defense

costs, the Thompson Memo significantly disrupted the employment
bargain

between

employer

and

employee

and

the

employees'

80. Janis, supra note 55. The employee's dependence is a result of the massive amount
of resources required to respond to the investigation and to defend one's self, if necessary, in
a white-collar context. Id.
81. Brian W. Walsh, Justice's Trap for Unwary Employees: Cooperate or Else, SALT
LAKE TRIB., Sept. 29, 2006, at Opinion. The following short story illustrates the vulnerability
of the modern-day employee:
Imagine that after almost 10 years at your company, you've been
promoted to supervisor of the finance department. Lately you've heard
through the grapevine that the company is the subject of a federal
criminal investigation, but you know you've done nothing wrong.
As you walk into your office one Monday morning, coffee in hand,
you get a call from your company's legal department. An attorney you've
never met tells you that the federal prosecutors investigating the company
would like to speak with you. You aren't technically required to
cooperate, he says, but it would be best for everyone if you did.
Your pulse races. What answer do you give? If you say yes, could
you be waiving some important right? If you say no, do you look
suspicious?
But, you remind yourself, you've done nothing wrong. Even if you
inadvertently violated some federal law you knew nothing about during
the course of your normal duties, your company will defend you and give
you your own lawyer if you end up needing one. Right?
Id.
82. See United States v. Stein (Stein 11), 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 335 (S.D.N.Y 2006). The
right to advancement of defense costs for matters arising from a person's job "is very much a
part of American life." Id. (emphasis added). Judge Kaplan explains how advancement is
crucial for most people who work:
Persons in jobs big and small, private and public, rely on it every day. Bus
drivers sued for accidents, cops sued for allegedly wrongful arrests, nurses
named in malpractice cases, news reporters sued in libel cases, and
corporate chieftains embroiled in securities litigation generally have
similar rights to have their employers pay their legal expenses if they are
sued as a result of their doing their jobs. This right is as much a part of the
bargainbetween employer and employee as salary or wages.
Id. (emphasis added).
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expectations regarding their organizations' provision of financial
assistance in defending lawsuits that arise from their employment.
c. The OrganizationalBenefits Derivedfrom Advancement

Additionally, advancement not only helps ensure the individual
defendants' abilities to hire adequate private defense counsel, it also
encourages service in organizations "by protecting their personal
financial resources from depletion [as a result of] . . . litigation that

results by reason of that service." ' Without advancement of defense
costs for matters arising as part of an individual's employment, firms
would experience more difficulties attracting and keeping a talented
workforce because "[o]nce the company is forced to withdraw its
support, its employees are left to fend for themselves in any ensuing
legal battles that may develop." 8' Therefore, as Professor Larry Ribstein
and others point out, without such protections, individuals may forego
certain business practices or employment in certain industries
altogether, due to the risk of having to defend a criminal indictment
without financial assistance from the organization.85
d. The Employee's Presumptionof Innocence

A more fundamental argument in opposition to the Thompson
Memo policy against advancement is that it disposed of the most basic
right in United States criminal justice-for defendants to be presumed
innocent until proven guilty. 86 Under the Thompson Memo, in order to
have been seen as cooperative in the government's investigation, "[t]he
minute an employee [was] charged with a federal crime connected with
his work-long before his 'culpability' [had] been determined in court,
and even if the company believe[d] him to be innocent-the company

83. Homestore, Inc. v. Tafeen, 888 A.2d 204, 211 (Del. 2005).
84. Couden, supra note 38, at 420.
85. See Ideoblog, http://busmovie.typepad.com/ideoblog/2006/06/the-kpmg-decisi.html
(June 29, 2006, 05:34); see also Scharf v. Edgcomb Corp., C.A. No. 15224, 1997 Del. Ch.
LEXIS 169, at *14-15 (Dec. 2, 1997) ("Indemnification for officers and directors should be
seen as less an individual benefit arising from personal employment than as a desirable
underwriting of risk by the corporation in anticipation of greater corporate-wide rewards.");
United States v. Weissman, No. S2 94 Cr. 760, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8540, at *7 (S.D.N.Y.
June 16, 1997) (quoting the defendant, former Chief Financial Officer (CFO) of the company,
as saying that he "would not have accepted the position of [CFO] if such indemnification [and
advancement] was not provided").
86. Irwin M. Stelzer, Protectingthe Innocent: Even White CollarDefendants Have Rights,
WKLY. STANDARD, Aug. 21/28, 2006, at 18.
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[would] fire him and cut off all support for his defense."87 As a result,

the pressure exerted on companies by the Thompson Memo's
advancement policy forced them to deprive their employees of their
basic right to presumptive innocence and to treat them as if they were
already found culpable in the crimes alleged.
e. The Employee's Rights to Counsel and a Fair Trial

Finally, one of the most influential criticisms put forward against the
Thompson Memo's advancement policy was that the policy "impair[ed]
the ability of natural persons to enjoy the rights the Constitution grants
them."8
In fact, during the KPMG tax-shelter cases,8 9 the
constitutionality of the Thompson Memo and the DOJ's advancement
policy were attacked by Judge Kaplan from the Southern District of
New York. °
During 2002 and 2003, KPMG, one of the world's largest accounting
firms,91 came under an Internal Revenue Service (IRS) investigation
concerning tax shelters.'
Several of KPMG's top partners and
employees93 were called to testify before the U.S. Senate at a hearing94
concerning the "development, marketing and implementation of abusive
tax shelters." 95 Following these developments, Eugene O'Kelly, then the

87. Geoffrey Colvin, Will Your Boss Betray You?, FORTUNE, July 24, 2006, at 67.
88. Ellard, supra note 32, at 994.
89. United States v. Stein (Stein 1), 410 F. Supp. 2d 316 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); United States v.
Stein (Stein If), 435 F. Supp. 2d 330 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); United States v. Stein (Stein i11), 461 F.
Supp. 2d 201 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); United States v. Stein (Stein IV), 495 F. Supp. 2d 407 (S.D.N.Y.
2007).
90. See Stein II, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 382 (declaring "that so much of the Thompson
Memorandum and the activities of the USAO as threatened to take into account, in deciding
whether to indict KPMG, whether KPMG would advance attorneys' fees to present or former
employees in the event they were indicted for activities undertaken in the course of their
employment interfered with the rights of such employees to a fair trial and to the effective
assistance of counsel and therefore violated the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the
Constitution").
91. "KPMG is a global network of professional firms providing Audit, Tax, and
Advisory services" in 148 countries with over 113,000 employees. KPMG, About KPMG,
http://www.kpmg.comlabout/ (last visited Oct. 4, 2007).
92. Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 338.
93. The terms "partner" and "employee" are used interchangeably in reference to this
case because the distinction is immaterial as it relates to the issue of advancing defense costs
for the individual.
94. Specifically, the Senate hearing took place under the auspices of the Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs. See id.
95. Id. Some, including Judge Kaplan, have referred to this case as "the largest tax fraud
case in United States history." Id. at 362; see also Jonathan D. Glater, 8 Former Partners of

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[91:549

Chairman of KPMG's Board of Directors, retained legal representation
from the well known law firm of Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom
LLP (Skadden) to develop a "cooperative approach" in responding to
the IRS inquiry.'
However, in early 2004, despite the firm's cooperative strategy and
its termination of several top employees,' the IRS made a criminal
referral of the KPMG matter to the DOJ.9' The referral was passed
along to the United States Attorney's Office (USAO) for the Southern
District of New York where it arrived on February 5, 2004. 99 At the
' and two Assistant
USAO, the case was supervised by Shirah Neiman 00
United States Attorneys (AUSAs), Mr. Weddle and Mr. Okula.'0 ' Upon
learning that the referral had reached the USAO, Skadden scheduled
' 02 a
meeting with the USAO for February 25, 2004, to discuss the matter.
During the initial meeting between Skadden and the USAO, the
subject of legal fees came up almost immediately."3 Skadden informed
the USAO that it had always been KPMG's customary practice to pay
the legal fees of its employees.1" However, Skadden qualified its
statement by saying that KPMG would not pay legal fees for those
employees who do not cooperate with the investigation or for those
KPMG Are Indicted: Charges Are Tied to Tax Shelters, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2005, at Cl.

96. Stein 11, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 339.
97. The following defendants, former senior partners, were terminated by KPMG after
their Senate testimony: Jeffrey Stein, Richard Smith, and Jeffrey Eischeid. Id.

98. Id.
99. Id. at 339-40.
100. Ms. Neiman was a participant in the drafting of the Holder Memo, the predecessor
to the Thompson Memo. Id.
101. Id. at 341.
102. Id. at 340-41.

103. See id. at 341. The initial discussion dealt with the structure of KPMG and any
potential conflicts of interest in the case. See id. Following the preliminary dialogue, the
advancement of legal fees was the main issue on the USAO's agenda. See id.
104. Id. at 342. It is interesting to note, as the court does in later proceedings, that when
Mr. O'Kelly, the director of KPMG, first announced that the firm was being investigated, but
before the initial meeting with the USAO, he stated the following to his employees:
Finally, you should expect that I and other members of leadership will

work diligently to bring this matter to a successful conclusion, provide you
with all the necessary support and keep you updated on a periodic basis.
In closing, I ask that you exhibit the resolve that you've shown throughout
the Xerox investigation which defines what makes us a greatfirm.
United States v. Stein (Stein IV), 495 F. Supp. 2d 390, 407 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). Notably, in the

Xerox investigation referenced by Mr. O'Kelly, KPMG expended over a total of $20 million
dollars in defense costs for four of its employees involved in the investigation. Id. at 408.
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employees who invoke their Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination. 0 5
After hearing this pronouncement, Ms. Neiman emphasized the
guidance offered by the Thompson Memo as it relates to advancement"
and said "'misconduct' . . . cannot 'be rewarded.""' 7 Mr. Weddle
followed up Ms. Neiman's statement by saying, "[I]f u [sic] have
'' 8
discretion re[garding] fees-we'll look at that under a microscope.
At the conclusion of their initial meeting, it was clear that although the
USAO did not specifically express itself, "it did not want KPMG to pay
legal fees."' 9
Following their meeting, in March 2004, Skadden requested that the
USAO notify it if any KPMG employees were not cooperating with the
investigation."0 Subsequently, when the USAO did notify Skadden of
uncooperative employees, Skadden would contact those employees'
representatives and stress that advancement of defense costs by KPMG
was conditional upon the employees' full cooperation with the
investigation."'
Skadden emphasized that those employees not
cooperating
would
be terminated and their advancement of funds would
12
off.
cut
be
When the investigation concluded, Skadden met with then Deputy
Attorney General James Comey..3 in Washington to persuade the DOJ
that KPMG had been cooperative and that an indictment was
unnecessary. 1 4 Skadden emphasized the fact that it had conditioned
advancement of attorneys' fees on each employee's full cooperation
with the investigation"5 and that it had pressured employees to

105. Stein II, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 342. Ultimately, KPMG decided to cap advancement of
defense costs at $400,000 per employee and condition the advancement on the employee's
cooperation with investigators. Id. at 345. In addition, KPMG said it would immediately
cease payments if the employee was indicted. Id. at 345-46.
106. See supra Part II.C.1.
107. Stein H,435 F. Supp. 2d at 342.
108. Id. at 344.
109. Id. The court said, "[N]o one at the meeting could have failed to draw that
conclusion." Id.
110. Id. at 347.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. See supra note 64.
114. Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 348-49.
115. Id. at 349. Skadden argued that KPMG "had done something 'never heard of
before"' by conditioning advancement of defense costs on the employee's cooperation. Id.
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cooperate by holding the payment of fees over their heads. 16 Skadden
argued that the cooperation 1exhibited
by KPMG in this case was at "'a
17
done.',
rarely
is
that
level..,

On August 29, 2005, KPMG realized the success of its cooperative
approach to the investigation by avoiding indictment and entering into a
Deferred Prosecution Agreement (DPA) with the DOJ."8 However,
around the same time, the government indicted the individuals " 9 under
investigation, and 120
as promised, KPMG proceeded to cut off payment of
costs.
defense
their
Consequently, on January 19, 2006, the KPMG defendants filed a

motion to dismiss their indictment, arguing that "the government had
interfered improperly with the advancement of attorneys' fees by
'
KPMG in violation of their constitutional and other rights."121
In
opposition, the government argued that KPMG decided by itself to cut
off the payment of legal fees and that the government
had not
"'coerc[ed]' or 'bull[ied]' KPMG into making its decision.' 22
1
After hearing the arguments for each side,"

Judge Kaplan ruled that

116. Id. Skadden explained to the DOJ that KPMG "took action" whenever it was
notified of an uncooperative employee. Id. It argued that by taking such actions, "current or
former personnel who otherwise would not have cooperated did cooperate, and those who
did not had their fees cut off and, in two instances, were separated from the firm." Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. The DPA required KPMG to admit wrongdoing, to accept charges in a onecount information, to pay a $456 million fine, to accept restrictions on its business practices,
and to continue cooperating with the government. Id. If KPMG abided by all such
requirements, then the government promised to dismiss the indictment against KPMG. Id.
119. There were eighteen individuals indicted, sixteen of which were former KPMG
partners. Rodney R. Peck et al., United States v. Stein: DOJ Policy Threatening Companies
with Indictment Based upon Advancement of Employee Legal Fees Ruled Unconstitutional,
MONDAQ, Aug. 9, 2006, http://www.mondaq.com/article.asp?articleid=41880&login=true.
120. Stein 11, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 350.
121. Id.
122. Id. In furtherance of its argument, Mr. Weddle prepared a declaration where he
recounted the USAO's initial meeting with Skadden on February 25, 2004, see supra text
accompanying notes 103-09, and said the USAO "did not instruct KPMG whether KPMG
should pay legal fees, whether KPMG should cap the payment of legal fees, or whether
KPMG should condition the payment of legal fees," Stein 11, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 351-52
(emphasis omitted). However, Judge Kaplan did not seem persuaded by the "freedom of
choice" argument offered by the government. Editorial, Corporate Injustice, WALL ST. J.,
Apr. 6, 2006, at A14. In fact, at a pretrial hearing, Mr. Weddle argued that "companies are
free to say, 'We're not going to cooperate' to which Judge Kaplan responded candidly,
"That's lame." Id.
123. Although KPMG was not an official party to this case, the firm was allowed to
participate in the proceedings, and it submitted a brief on the issue. Stein H,435 F. Supp. 2d
at 352.
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the government had violated the individual defendants' Fifth 124 and
Sixth 25 Amendment rights by causing'2 6 KPMG to "[c]ut [o]ff [p]ayment27
of [liegal [f]ees and [o]ther [d]efense [c]osts [u]pon [i]ndictment.'
Although Judge Kaplan did not dismiss the indictments immediately' 28 he did eventually do so' 29-he ordered that KPMG be allowed to
advance the defendants' defense costs without interference by the
government.'30 Judge Kaplan did not base his decision on the fact that
all employees have a constitutional right to have their legal costs paid by
their employers;' rather, he held that the government could not
interfere unreasonably or unjustifiably with a defendant's constitutional

124. In relevant part, the Fifth Amendment states, "[Nior shall [any person] be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
125. The Sixth Amendment states the following: "In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to .
have the assistance of counsel for his defense." Id. at
amend. VI.
126. The court found that "KPMG's decision to cut off all payments of legal fees and
expenses to anyone who was indicted and to limit and to condition such payments prior to
indictment upon cooperation with the government was the direct consequence of the pressure
applied by the Thompson Memorandum and the USAO." Stein II, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 353.
127. Id. at 356.
128. Id. at 374 (holding dismissal to be inappropriately premature because other
remedies had not been exhausted to "restore[] [the defendants] to the position they would
have occupied but for the government's" interference). But see United States v. Stein (Stein
IV), 495 F. Supp. 2d 390, 427 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (dismissing the charges against almost all of the
individual defendants).
129. Id. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the district court in this case
did not have the power to exercise ancillary jurisdiction over fee advancement claims made
by the individual defendants against KPMG. Stein v. KPMG, LLP, 486 F.3d 753, 756 (2d Cir.
2007); see infra note 130. Also, the district court was unsuccessful in its attempt to have the
individual defendants and KPMG negotiate a settlement for the advancement of defense
costs. Stein IV, 495 F. Supp. 2d at 394 n.6. Therefore, the individual defendants renewed
their motion for dismissal, and for most of them dismissal was granted by Judge Kaplan, see
id. at 425-27, "only after pursuing every alternative short of dismissal and only with the
greatest reluctance," id. at 427. Upon the individual defendants' final motion for dismissal,
the Government conceded dismissal as to all but three defendants, the same three who were
not granted dismissal. Id. at 423, 425, 427. Apparently, "[t]he government wanted the
dismissal," so it could appeal Judge Kaplan's ruling that the application of the Thompson
Memo in this case was unconstitutional. Lynnley Browning, Prosecutors in KPMG Case
Appeal Dismissalof Charges,N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 2007, at C4 (quoting Barry Boss, a defense
attorney for Cozen O'Connor in the District of Columbia). The appeal was filed with the
Second Circuit on July 16, 2007, the same day as Judge Kaplan's dismissal order was issued.
See id.
130. Stein If, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 380. The court gave two alternatives: (1) KPMG could
reinstate the advancement payments on its own, or (2) the defendants could obtain an order
from the court demanding that KPMG make the advancement payments. Id.
131. See Colvin, supra note 87.
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assistance of counsel.132

Specifically, the court found that the government's interference with the
defendants' ability to choose their own counsel and to use otherwise
available resources for their defense costs resulted in a lack of
fundamental fairness 33' and an infringement on the defendants' due
process rights under the Fifth Amendment. 3 4 "In short, fairness in
criminal proceedings requires that the defendant be firmly in the
driver's seat, and that the prosecution not be a backseat driver."'35
Although the government submitted three justifications for its
advancement policy,'36 none were narrowly tailored to achieve the
government's compelling interest in investigating and prosecuting
crime.' Therefore, the DOJ policy did not meet the strict scrutiny test
132. Stein H,435 F. Supp. 2d at 382.
133. Id. at 362; see Stein IV, 495 F. Supp. 2d at 422 ("A criminal defendant has a
constitutional right 'to control the presentation of his defense."') (quoting Lainfiesta v. Artuz,
253 F.3d 151, 154 (2d Cir. 2001), cert. denied, Lainfiesta v. Greiner, 535 U.S. 1019 (2002)); see
also United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 126 S. Ct. 2557, 2563 (2006) (holding that the
unjustified interference with the right to choose one's counsel violates the Sixth Amendment
without regard to prejudice). The court demonstrated that the government's interference
would affect the defendants' representation:
To prepare for and try a case of such length requires substantial resources.
Yet the government has interfered with the ability of the KPMG
Defendants to obtain resources they otherwise would have had. Unless
remedied, this interference almost certainly will affect what these
defendants can afford to permit their counsel to do. This would impact
the defendants' ability to present the defense they wish to present by
limiting the means lawfully available to them.
Stein 11, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 362.
134. Id. at 365; see Stein IV, 495 F. Supp. 2d at 409 (finding that the actions of the
AUSAs in this case "shock[] the conscience"); see also County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523
U.S. 833, 845-53 (1998). In County of Sacramento, the court tested whether challenged
government action of a particular employee "shocks the conscience" in reference to
substantive due process protections against "the [government's] exercise of power without
any reasonable justification in the service of a legitimate governmental objective." 523 U.S at
846.
135. Stein 11, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 358.
136. Id. at 363. The justifications advanced by the government were the following: (1)
the policy "is intended to facilitate just charging decisions concerning business entities by
focusing on a consideration pertinent to gauging their degrees of cooperation"; (2) the policy
"seeks to strengthen the government's ability to investigate and prosecute corporate crime by
encouraging companies to pressure their employees to aid the government"; and (3) the
policy "seeks to punish those whom prosecutors deem culpable." Id.
137. Id. at 364. The court explained why the Memo infringed on the defendants'
constitutional rights by interfering with KPMG's advancement policy:
[T]his aspect [advancement] of the Thompson Memorandum is not narrowly
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applied to fundamental rights, and it was held to be in violation of the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment." 8
Moreover, Judge Kaplan recognized that the Thompson Memo and
the DOJ violated the defendants' Sixth Amendment right to counsel as
well."9 The court stated that the Thompson Memo and the government
infringed upon the defendants' right to choose their own lawyers and to
utilize all available funds for their defense.' °
In order for the government's interference to have been justified, the
court needed to find that the government's interests in law enforcement
sufficiently outweighed the defendants' interests in accessing the
resources available to them for raising an adequate defense."' However,
the court rejected the government's explanation by finding that
although "advancement of legal fees occasionally might be part of an
obstruction scheme or indicate a lack of full cooperation .. . [, that] is
insufficient to justify the government's interference with the right of
tailored to achieve a compelling objective. It discourages and, as a practical
matter, often prevents companies from providing employees and former
employees with the financial means to exercise their constitutional rights to defend
themselves .... It therefore burdens excessively the constitutional rights of the
individuals whose ability to defend themselves it impairs and, accordingly, fails
strict scrutiny.
Id. at 364-65.
138. Id. at 365; see also Stein IV, 495 F. Supp. 2d at 409 (finding that the actions of the
AUSAs in this case "shock[ed] the conscience" under County of Sacramento, 523 U.S. 833
(1998)).
139. Stein H, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 365-69. The court rejected two arguments set forth by
the government saying that the Sixth Amendment should not apply in this case. See id. at
366-67. First, the government argued that the Sixth Amendment "attaches only upon the
initiation of a criminal proceeding" and the alleged government interference took place preindictment. Id. at 366. The court rejected this argument by reasoning that although the
government's actions did take place pre-indictment, its actions were known to likely have "an
unconstitutional effect upon indictment." Id. Second, the court rejected the government's
argument that the defendants were seeking to spend "other people's money," because the
defendants had a reasonable expectation that any legal expenses arising from their
employment at KPMG would be paid by the firm. Id. at 367.
140. Id. at 366; see Stein IV, 495 F. Supp. 2d at 422; see also United States v. GonzalezLopez, 126 S.Ct. 2557, 2563 (2006) ("Deprivation of the right [to counsel] is 'complete' when
the defendant is erroneously prevented from being represented by the lawyer he wants,
regardless of the quality of the representation he received."). Explaining the violation, the
court said, "The government here acted with the purpose of minimizing these defendants'
access to resources necessary to mount their defenses or, at least, in reckless disregard that
this would be the likely result of its actions." Stein 11, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 366-67.
Furthermore, the court stated that the Thompson Merho "undermines the proper functioning
of the adversary process that the Constitution adopted as the mode of determining guilt or
innocence in criminal cases." Id. at 368-69.
141. Id. at 368.
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individual criminal defendants to obtain resources lawfully available to
them in order to defend themselves.',12 Therefore, Judge Kaplan ruled
that the DOJ's advancement policy and the application of the

Thompson

Memo in this case violated the

defendants'

Sixth

Amendment rights. 43
Judge Kaplan's opinion marked the first time a federal court took
the DOJ to task over the "inherent unfairness of the Thompson
Memo,"'4" and the decision to do so was met with mostly enthusiastic
praise.'415 Moreover, because the decision was from the well-respected

Southern District of New York, it had great impact potential.'" For
example, Professor Ribstein predicted that the decision would be "a
landmark.' 47 Others suggested that it had "the potential of being a
watershed case that [would] operate as a signal
to the U.S. attorneys not
48
vehicle.'
coercive
a
as
guidelines
to use the
The true impact of Judge Kaplan's decision on the DOJ is unknown,
but the decision certainly added to the mounting pressure on the DOJ to
revise the Thompson Memo and its advancement policy. In fact, the

pressure became so great that the DOJ revised the Thompson Memo on
142. Id. at 369.
143. Id. at 365-69. The court did not require that the defendants make a showing of
prejudice as is normally required in Sixth Amendment cases, Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 692 (1984), because the defendants were deprived outright of the right to choose
their own counsel, see Gonzalez-Lopez, 126 S. Ct. at 2563.
144. Jack King, NACDL News: KPMG Case Is a Victory over the Thompson Memo, 30
CHAMPION, Aug. 2006, at 6, 6; see also Browning, supra note 35.
145. For example, the July 24, 2006 edition of Fortune magazine opens a column with
the following: "Thank you, Judge Lewis A. Kaplan. You've just done a big favor to anyone
who could conceivably be charged, even unjustly, with a federal crime in connection with his
or her job-which means anyone who works." Colvin, supra note 87. On the other hand,
some critics attacked Judge Kaplan for basing his decision on constitutional protections,
despite Kaplan's use of U.S. Supreme Court precedent. Posting of Dale Oesterle to Business
Law Prof. Blog, http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/business-law/2006/06/the-kpmg-case.html
(June 28, 2006) (stating that simply because a policy may be unfair does not make it
unconstitutional). Another suggestion is that the decision could work in favor of the DOJ's
advancement policy. Professor Peter J. Henning says that insurers selling directors and
officers coverage may begin to impose their own Thompson-like requirements in their
policies by capping advancement payments and by requiring that payments be discontinued
upon an individual's indictment. Id. If so, Henning argues that companies will then be forced
to impose formal limits and cut-off points for their own advancement policies, leaving more
employees on their own without the support of their organizations. Id.
146. Peck et al., supra note 119.
147. Ideoblog, supra note 85.
148. Lynnley Browning, U.S. Tactic on KPMG Questioned, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2006,
at C1 (quoting Steven J. Bronis, Chairman of the white-collar crime section of the American
Bar Association).
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December 12, 2006, less than three years after its promulgation.'

9

III. THE MCNuLTY MEMO: REVISING THE DOJ'S
ADVANCEMENT POLICY (SORT OF)

Here, the DOJ's motivation for amending its advancement policy is
discussed and the revisions contained in the McNulty Memo are
presented. Then, the McNulty Memo's lack of substantive change
regarding advancement is illustrated, and finally, the possibility of
congressional intervention is introduced.
A. Criticism of the Thompson Memo Motivates McNulty
Although Judge Kaplan's decisions in the KPMG tax-shelter cases'50
may have helped focus greater attention on the Thompson Memo's
advancement policy' and in hastening the DOJ's decision to revise its
policy,'52 it was not the only criticism that levied pressure on the DOJ to
make an immediate change. In fact, a broad coalition of organizations
and individuals had voiced their displeasure with regard to the
advancement provisions in the Thompson Memo during the months
immediately preceding the DOJ's revision.'53 Even former Deputy
Attorney General Thompson"' said that the DOJ was using the

149. McNulty Memo, supra note 24.
150. United States v. Stein (Stein 1), 410 F. Supp. 2d 316 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); United States
v. Stein (Stein 1I), 435 F. Supp. 2d 330 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); United States v. Stein (Stein Ill), 461
F. Supp. 2d 201 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); United States v. Stein (Stein IV), 495 F. Supp. 2d 407
(S.D.N.Y. 2007); see supra Part II.C.2.e.
151. Lynnley Browning, U.S. Moves to Restrain Prosecutors, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2006,
at C1.
152. See Ideoblog, http://busmovie.typepad.com/ideoblog/2006/12/the mcnulty-mem.
html (Dec. 13, 2006, 06:16); see also Nathan A. Fishbach, The McNulty Memo: Why It Matters
to CorporateCounsel, Wis. L.J. (Milwaukee, Wis.), Jan. 8, 2007, at 5A.
153. See supra Part II.C.2. The coalition included groups such as the National
Association of Manufacturers, the American Civil Liberties Union, Lorraine Woellert, Justice
Softens Investigation Guidelines, Bus. WEEK ONLINE, Dec. 13, 2006, http://www.business
week.com/bwdaily/dnflash/content/dec2006/db20061213_615165.htm,
the Association of
Corporate Counsel, the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, Martha Neil,
Thompson Memo Changes Not Enough, ABA Says, A.B.A. J. E-REPORT, Dec. 15, 2006,
http://www.abanet.org/journal/ereport/dl5specter.html, the U.S. Senate, the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce, the American Bar Association, and individuals such as Judge Lewis Kaplan,
Larry D. Thompson, the author of the Thompson Memo, Jessica Guynn, Feds Reduce
Pressurein White-Collar Probes: Now Companies Will Often Be Able to Offer Counsel, SAN
FRANCISCO CHRON., Dec. 13, 2006, at D2, and Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson, Sarah
Johnson, Down to the Wire: Thompson Memo Revised?, CFO.COM, Dec. 8, 2006,
http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/8401796?f=related.
154. See supra text accompanying note 15.
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Thompson Memo too aggressively and that "the [DOJ] should consider
'
perhaps making appropriate revisions to the memo." 55
Moreover, on
December 8, 2006, Senator Arlen Specter, then Chairman of the Senate
Judiciary Committee, introduced the Attorney-Client Privilege
Protection Act of 2006; the Act included, among other provisions,
language that would completely prohibit federal government agents

from conditioning an indictment on whether the company was
cooperating by not advancing defense costs to its employees.
In the face of such widespread criticism, seemingly coming from all
angles,"' the DOJ made a decision to revise the Thompson Memo,
especially in relation to its advancement policy.5 8 Although Deputy
Attorney General McNulty states that the DOJ's revisions were made
after reviewing and meeting with "those in the business and legal
communities who raised concerns about the [DOJ's] guidance,"' 5 9 many
speculate that the changes were made simply to fend off possible
legislation and quiet the chorus of discontent) 6°
Whatever the true motivation for the DOJ's policy shift concerning
advancement may have been, the change was formally introduced on
December 12, 2006, and has since been referred to as the McNulty
Memo. 161
155. Lara Jakes Jordan, Writer of Crackdown Policy Says It's Gone Too Far: He Says
Memo Was Only Meant for Limited Use, HOUSTON CHRON., Dec. 3, 2006, at Business 4.
156. S. 30, 109th Cong. § 3 (2006); see infra text accompanying note 223; see also Part
IV.B.
157. See supra notes 153-55 and 'accompanying text; see also Johnson, supra note 153
(quoting Attorney Sam Damren of Dykema Gossett as saying, "I believe that placing as much
pressure from as many different directions as possible on the DOJ to withdraw aspects of the
Thompson memorandum . . . is appropriate."); William M. Sullivan, Jr., The McNulty
Memorandum: New DOJ Policies on Attorney-Client Privilege and Attorney Work Product
Protections, METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNS., Feb. 2007, at 34, 34. ("The Justice Department's
most recent efforts to reconfigure its policies and procedures governing corporate
prosecutions arise in the context of mounting judicial and congressional pressure, and amid a
sustained chorus of criticism from the U.S. business and legal communities.").
158. See McNulty Memo, supra note 24; see also infra Part III.B.
159. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, U.S. Deputy Attorney General Paul J.
McNulty Revises Charging Guidelines for Prosecuting Corporate Fraud: New Guidance
Further Encourages Corporate Compliance (Dec. 12, 2006).
160. Posting
of
Ellen
S.
Podgor
to
Business
Law
Prof.
Blog,
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/whitecollarcrime-blog/2006/week50/index.html
(Dec. 12,
2006). In fact, William McGuinness, Chairman of the New York litigation department at
Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson, referred to the DOJ's actions as a kind of "strategic
retreat," saying, "when you're going to lose a battle, you back up to the point you think you
can defend." Marcia Coyle, The "McNulty Memo": Real Change or Retreat?, NAT'L L.J., Dec.
20, 2006, http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/whitecollar/wcnews066.
161. See McNulty Memo, supra note 24.
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B. The Advancement Policy Under the McNulty Memo
1. The McNulty Memo Cover Letter-An Attempt to Frame the Issue
Preceding the text of the McNulty Memo is a cover letter from
Deputy Attorney General McNulty that begins by touting the DOJ's
"unprecedented success in prosecuting corporate fraud during the last
four years," and he claims that the most significant success realized has
been the increased recognition of the need for cooperation on the part
of business organizations.'
Additionally, the cover letter states that he
"remain[s] convinced that the fundamental principles that have guided
[the DOJ's] enforcement practices are sound... [and] are welcomed by
most corporations... because good corporate leadership shares many of
'
our goals."163
However, McNulty continues the letter by recognizing that many
"responsible corporate officials" have expressed their concerns with the
"challenges they face in discharging their duties to the corporation while
responding in a meaningful way to a government investigation.""
Then, the letter concludes with McNulty revealing that the DOJ has
decided to "adjust certain aspects" of its organizational charging policy
"in ways that will further promote public confidence in the [DOJ],
encourage corporate fraud prevention efforts, and clarify [the DOJ's]
goals without16 sacrificing [its] ability to prosecute these important cases
effectively., 1
Therefore, on its face, the cover letter is an attempt to set the stage
for the text of the McNulty Memo by stating up-front that the DOJ does
not see its charging practices as flawed or over-aggressive. 66 Rather, the
DOJ seems to take the position that the policies articulated in the
Thompson Memo are simply unclear in practice and that the McNulty
Memo revisions will restore clarity to the organizational charging
guidelines.Y17 However, this is inconsistent with the fact that the text of
the McNulty Memo significantly alters the DOJ's practices in regards to
162. Cover Letter from Paul J. McNulty, U.S. Deputy Attorney General, to Heads of
Department Components and United States Attorneys, at 1 (Dec. 12, 2006), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/speech/2006/mcnultymemo.pdf [hereinafter McNulty Memo Cover
Letter].
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 2.
166. Id. at 1; see also supra text accompanying note 163.
167. McNulty Memo Cover Letter, supra note 162, at 1-2; see also supra text
accompanying note 165.
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advancement, at least in theory."f Consequently, the McNulty Memo
Cover Letter is most likely nothing more than an instrument to help
frame the DOJ's revisions in a light that downplays its backtracking on
the use of overly aggressive practices, such as discouraging organizations
from advancing defense costs to its employees. 6 9
2. The McNulty Memo Revisions
The McNulty Memo itself begins with a newly created section that
outlines the duties of federal prosecutors and corporate leaders.'70 It
points out that prosecutors, by investigating and prosecuting
wrongdoing, and business leaders, by properly exercising their fiduciary
duties, have a shared responsibility in promoting public trust and
confidence in business organizations and markets.' 7' By doing so, the
McNulty Memo makes clear that the DOJ continues to encourage and
to expect organizations under investigation to cooperate with the
government in an effort to punish wrongdoers, despite the changes
made to the organizational charging policy.'72
Beyond that, there are only a few actual substantive changes made
by the McNulty Memo relative to the Thompson Memo. First, the
section entitled "Factors to Be Considered" amends the previous
language of the Thompson Memo by eliminating provisions that allow
prosecutors to consider the organization's waiver of the attorney-client
and work product privileges when determining the organization's level
of cooperation.'73 Additionally, the section entitled "The Value of
Cooperation"' 74 replaces the section in the Thompson Memo entitled75
"Charging a Corporation: Cooperation and Voluntary Disclosure."'
The DOJ eliminates several factors from consideration in this section,

168. Compare McNulty Memo, supra note 24, at pt. VII.B.3 ("Prosecutors generally
should not take into account whether a corporation is advancing attorneys' fees to employees
or agents under investigation and indictment."), with Thompson Memo, supra note 15, at pt.
VI.B ("[A] corporation's promise of support to culpable employees and agents.... through
may be considered by the prosecutor in weighing the
the advancing of attorneys fees ....
extent and value of a corporation's cooperation.").
169. See Posting of Ellen S. Podgor to White Collar Crime Prof. Blog,
(Dec. 14,
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/whitecollarcrime-blog/2006/week50/index.html
2006).
170. McNulty Memo, supra note 24, at pt. I.
171. Id.
172. Id.; Press Release, Justice Department, supra note 159.
173. See McNulty Memo, supra note 24, at pt. III.A.
174. Id. at pt. VII.
175. Thompson Memo, supra note 15, at pt. VI.
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including the corporation's willingness to make employees available as
witnesses, the corporation's timely disclosure of results from internal
investigations, and, again, the corporation's willingness to waive the
attorney-client and work product privileges.
Finally, in the same
section of the McNulty Memo, the DOJ approaches the topic of
advancement in a subsection entitled "Shielding Culpable Employees
and Agents,"'" which may provide insight as to how the DOJ truly views
the issue going forward. 78 However, at least on the surface, the DOJ
does take steps to limit government prosecutors' discretion in
considering advancement when determining an organization's level of
cooperation. 7 9
3. The McNulty Memo's Advancement Policy, as Stated
Specifically, the new advancement policy states, "Prosecutors
generally should not take into account whether a corporation is
advancing attorneys' fees to employees or agents under investigation
and indictment."'" Although seemingly a straightforward policy, the
McNulty Memo includes a couple of exceptions to the general
principle 8' that may limit the practical effect of the new policy
significantly. First, in "extremely rare cases," prosecutors may take the
issue of advancement into consideration "when the totality of the
circumstances show that [advancement] was intended to impede a
criminal investigation."'
In such situations, permission must be
obtained from the Deputy Attorney General before prosecutors may
use the advancement issue as a consideration in their charging
decisions. 183 Additionally, the policy states that nothing in the McNulty
Memo "prevent[s] a prosecutor from asking questions about an
attorney's representation of a corporation or its employees."'4 The
DOJ claims that "routine questions" regarding an attorney's
representation arise frequently in corporate investigations and that such

176. See McNulty Memo, supra note 24, at pt. VII.A.
177. Id. at pt. VII.B.3.
178. Donald Searles & Jay L. Pomerantz, DOJ Revises Policy on Demanding Waiver of
Attorney-Client Privilege, MONDAQ, Jan. 2, 2007, http://www.mondaq.com/article.asp?
articleid=45242.
179. See McNulty Memo, supra note 24, at pt. VII.B.3.
180. Id.

181. See infra text accompanying notes 200-10.
182. McNulty Memo, supra note 24, at pt. VII.B.3 n.3.
183. Id.

184. Id. at pt. VII.B.3.
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'
questions are "appropriate." 85
Therefore, although the general principle of the revised
advancement policy prohibits prosecutors from considering
advancement payments in their charging decisions,"s the substantive

information regarding the source of the legal fees can still be properly

elicited by prosecutors at any point in an investigation187 and, in some
cases, may be considered in the charging decision if the DOJ feels there
is intent to impede the investigation. ' 8 As a result, it is unlikely that the
advancement policy promulgated in the McNulty Memo will actually

improve protections for employees who traditionally have access to
advancement payments.
C. Why the New Advancement Policy Lacks Substantive Improvement

Some argue that the DOJ's revision concerning advancement is an
encouraging development that may go "a long way toward restoring

needed balance to the investigation process,"'" while others view the
change with more cautious optimism," seeing the McNulty Memo as
merely "a step in the correct direction.' ' 1 Most agree, however, that the
new policy represents only "a modest improvement"' that does not go

185. Id. at pt. VII.B.3 n.4.
186. Id. at pt. VII.B.3.
187. Id. at pt. VII.B.3 n.4.
188. Id. at pt. VII.B.3 n.3.
189. David Z. Seide, Department of Justice McNulty Memo Curtails Controversional
Portions of Thompson Memo-Legislation Introduced in the Senate, WilmerHale Email
Alerts, (Dec. 13, 2006), http://www.wilmerhale.com/publications/whpubsdetail.aspx?
publication=3507; see also Browning, supra note 151 (quoting Stephen J. Bronis, executive
director of the white-collar crime committee of the American Bar Association, as saying,
"[T]here are hopefully going to be less abusive (prosecutions]."); Guynn, supra note 153
(quoting Hastings College of Law Professor Rory Little as saying that the DOJ's revision "isa
good example of one of those healthy self-corrections").
190. Woellert, supra note 153. Senator Patrick Leahy of Connecticut, Chairman of the
Senate Judiciary Committee, seems to be hedging his opinion of the revisions by stating that
he welcomes the new policy and is happy that the DOJ has "moved away from its most
excessive practices," Neil, supra note 153, but that the revisions do not go far enough, Guynn,
supra note 153.
Senator Leahy also says that he will "continue to monitor the
implementation" of the policies embodied in the McNulty Memo. Neil, supra note 153.
However, he has not joined in sponsoring the Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of
2007, nor has he included the issue on the Senate Judiciary Committee's agenda. See 110 Bill
Tracking S.186 (2007); see also Sarah Johnson, You Have a Right to an Attorney (on the
Company's Dime), CFO.COM, July 24, 2007, http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/9537367.
191. Podgor, supra note 160.
192. Woellert, supra note 153 (quoting Karen Mathis, president of the American Bar
Association).
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far enough to restore employee access to advancement payments, free
from government interference. '93

Substantive complaints concerning the advancement provisions in
the McNulty Memo revolve around three general issues.
1. The McNulty Memo's Non-Binding Effect

One of the most significant weaknesses of the McNulty Memo is the
fact that, like all other DOJ policy guidelines, 1

binding and do not have the force of

law.' 95

94

the provisions are non-

Therefore, if a prosecutor

violates the McNulty Memo's provisions, there is very limited recourse96
available to remedy the violation.'"
Moreover, because the McNulty Memo is only an internal, nonbinding policy statement, the DOJ is free to re-revise its advancement
policy whenever it pleases by simply issuing a subsequent policy
memorandum-something it apparently feels comfortable doing, as
evidenced by the Thompson Memo replacing the Holder Memo 98 and
the McNulty Memo replacing the Thompson Memo'" in a span totaling
only ten years.
2. Prosecutors Are Permitted to Ask "Routine" Questions Concerning
Advancement
Additionally, as previously discussed," ° under the McNulty Memo,
government prosecutors still have the authority to ask "routine"
193. Bill McConnell, Business to DOJ: Shift Further, DAILY DEAL, Dec. 13, 2006;
Ameet Sachdev, Toned-Down Tactics in CorporateProbes, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 13, 2006, at Cl;
The D & 0 Diary, http://www.dandodiary.com/articles/mcnulty-memo/ (Dec. 17, 2006).
194. The U.S Attorney's Manual states that internal guidance documents are "not
intended to, [do] not, and may not be relied upon to create any rights, substantive or
procedural, enforceable at law by any party in any matter civil or criminal." U.S. Attorney
Manual § 1-1.100.
195. Id.; Nathan A. Fishbach, Are the McNulty Memo's Changes Significant?, Wis. L.J.
(Milwaukee, Wis.), Jan. 15, 2007, at 5A; Posting of Peter J. Henning to White Collar Crime
Prof. Blog, http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/whitecollarcrime-blog/2006/12/protecting-the1.html (Dec. 13, 2006); see also Browning, supra note 151 (quoting Deputy Attorney General
McNulty as admitting that the McNulty Memo's provisions "do not create any legal rights").
196. An individual can submit a complaint to the Office of Professional Responsibility
regarding the practices of the U.S. Attorney(s). Henning, supra note 195.
197. Sachdev, supra note 193 ("If some prosecutor violates the rules, the defendant has
no recourse." (quoting Dean David Yellen, School of Law, Loyola University Chicago));
Henning, supra note 195.
198. See supra text accompanying notes 36-37.
199. See supra text accompanying note 161.
200. See supra text accompanying notes 184-87.

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[91:549

questions regarding the payment of attorneys' fees for individual
defendants. 2 '
Of course, this allows the prosecution to gather
substantive information about who is paying for the individual
defendants' legal fees.
Therefore, while the McNulty Memo advancement policy directs
prosecutors, for the most part, 2°2 to forego considering this information
when determining an organization's level of cooperation, 23 the
information is available and can be viewed by the prosecution,
consciously or subconsciously, as a sign of whether the organization is
acting cooperatively. " All else being equal, an organization that
volunteers information pertaining to advancement will be considered
more cooperative than an organization that does not and, therefore, will
be less likely to face indictment. Consequently, despite the revision, the
result is the same under the McNulty Memo advancement policy as it
would be under the Thompson Memo advancement policy where such
information was used expressly to determine an organization's level of
cooperation. 5
3. The Exception to the Rule
Finally, the McNulty Memo includes an exception to its general
advancement policy 2 that allows prosecutors to consider advancement
payments when determining the level of organizational cooperation in
the charging decision if the prosecution believes that advancement
payments were made as part of an attempt to impede or obstruct an
investigation.0
Although the exception can be employed only after
prosecutors are granted approval from the Deputy Attorney General, 20,
the Deputy Attorney General will likely be naive to the circumstances
surrounding the case and will be inclined to take the prosecutors'
requests for approval at face-value. 209 Therefore, like in the Thompson
201. McNulty Memo, supra note 24, at pt. VII.B.3 n.4.; see also Searles, supra note 178.
202. See infra Part III.C.3.; see also supra text accompanying notes 182-83.
203. McNulty Memo, supra note 24, at pt. VII.B.3.
204. See text accompanying notes 183-88. It is hard to imagine how the USAO could
not view an organization that willingly provides information regarding advancement as being
more cooperative than an organization that chooses not to provide such information. So,
while the tack of disclosure may not be considered in determining the level of cooperation,
voluntary disclosure will certainly be considered as a sign of cooperation.
205. Thompson Memo, supra note 15, at pt. VI.B.
206. McNulty Memo, supra note 24, at pt. VII.B.3.
207. Id. at pt. VII.B.3. n.3.
208. Id.
209. Searles, supra note 178.
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Memo, field prosecutors are in the driver's seat in relation to when the
issue of advancement will be considered
organization's level of cooperation."'

in

determining

an

D. The McNulty Memo's Lack of Substantive Improvement
Gives Congress an Opportunity
While the McNulty Memo provides some guidance relative to how
organizations should respond when faced with misconduct allegations,
it is unclear, in light of the policy as stated, how prosecutors will attempt
to use the advancement issue as a charging consideration going
forward. 2'2 As a result, the McNulty Memo may be more valuable for its
acknowledgement of the problems with the Thompson Memo rather
than for any of its proposed solutions to those problems.2
Consequently, the call for Congress to remove advancement
completely from prosecutors' charging decisions continues to gain
strength, despite the DOJ's attempt to placate concerns regarding its
advancement policy. 2 4

In particular, the Attorney-Client Privilege

Protection Act of 2007,215 which removes the issue of advancement
completely from the charging determination," 6 has been introduced in
both houses of Congress and looks to have promising viability.217
IV. THE CONTINUED CALL FOR LEGISLATION TO END THE
CONTROVERSY

This section discusses the Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act
of 2007, presents its advantages over the McNulty Memo's advancement
policy, and concludes that the advancement provisions in the proposed
legislation should be adopted.
210. Coyle, supra note 160.
211. Fishbach, supra note 195.
212. In fact, some claim that the "McNulty Memorandum breaks no new ground from
the Thompson Memorandum" in regards to advancement. Searles, supra note 178. The
claim gains support in the fact that the McNulty Memo does not address a situation, like that
in Stein, where the organization has a long-standing policy of advancing attorneys' fees but is
not statutorily or contractually required to do so. Id. In such a situation, it may be unclear to
an organization under investigation what practices will be viewed as legitimate as opposed to
obstructive. Id.
213. McConnell, supra note 193.
214. Browning, supra note 151; Podgor, supra note 160.
215. S. 186, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 3013, 110th Cong. (2007).
216. S. 186, 110th Cong. § 3(b)(2)(B) (2007); H.R. 3013, 110th Cong. § 3(b)(2)(B)
(2007).
217. See 110 Bill Tracking S. 186 (2007); 110 Bill Tracking H.R. 3013 (2007).

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[91:549

A. The Attorney-Client Privilege ProtectionAct of 2007
On December 8, 2006, just before the end of the 109th Congress, in
an attempt to encourage the DOJ to revise its guidelines concerning
organizational charging decisions
Senator Arlen Specter introduced
the Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2006.2"9
Senator Specter's bill proposes several "bright-line" rules.220
Specifically, it prohibits federal prosecutors from requesting that the
organization or its employees waive their attorney-client or work
product privileges.2'
It also forbids federal prosecutors from
conditioning a charging decision on, or using as a factor in determining
the level of an organization's cooperation, any of the following: (1) the
valid assertion of attorney-client or work product privileges, 2 (2) the
advancement of attorneys' fees,223 (3) the use of joint defense
agreements, 24 (4) the sharing of information with an employee, 5 or (5)
the failure to terminate or sanction an employee for invoking his or her
constitutional protections 2 26
Shortly after Senator Specter proposed the Attorney-Client
Privilege Protection Act of 2006, the DOJ announced that it would, in
what ultimately became the McNulty Memo, revise some of its
227
organizational

charging policies found in the Thompson Memo.

218. Johnson, supra note 153.
219. S. 30, 109th Cong. (2006).
220. Searles, supra note 178.
221. S. 30, 109th Cong. § 3(b)(1) (2006); S. 186, 110th Cong. § 3(b)(1) (2007); see also
H.R. 3013, 110th Cong. § 3(b)(1) (2007) (proposing the identical bill in the House of
Representatives).
222. S.30, 109th Cong. § 3(b)(2)(A) (2006); S. 186, 110th Cong. § 3(b)(2)(A) (2007); see
also H.R. 3013, 110th Cong. § 3(b)(2)(A) (2007) (proposing the identical bill in the House of
Representatives).
223. S. 30, 109th Cong. § 3(b)(2)(B) (2006); S. 186, 110th Cong. § 3(b)(2)(B) (2007); see
also H.R. 3013, 110th Cong. § 3(b)(2)(B) (2007) (proposing the identical bill in the House of
Representatives).
224. S.30, 109th Cong. § 3(b)(2)(C) (2006); S.186, 110th Cong. § 3(b)(2)(C) (2007); see
also H.R. 3013, 110th Cong. § 3(b)(2)(C) (2007) (proposing the identical bill in the House of
Representatives).
225. S.30, 109th Cong. § 3(b)(2)(D) (2006); S. 186, 110th Cong. § 3(b)(2)(D) (2007); see
also H.R. 3013, 110th Cong. § 3(b)(2)(D) (2007) (proposing the identical bill in the House of
Representatives).
226. S. 30, 109th Cong. § 3(b)(2)(E) (2006); S.186, 110th Cong. § 3(b)(2)(E) (2007); see
also H.R. 3013, 110th Cong. § 3(b)(2)(E) (2007) (proposing the identical bill in the House of
Representatives).
227. Press Release, Justice Department, supra note 159. Because the DOJ announced
the promulgation of the McNulty Memo only four days after Senator Specter introduced his
proposed legislation, many speculate that the DOJ's revisions were motivated by the desire to
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However, apparently not satisfied with the extent of the DOJ's
221 eao
revisions, Senator Specter reaffirmed his desire to enact his proposed
legislation by introducing the Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act
of 2007, identical to the 2006 legislation, at the beginning of the 110th
Congress. 29
To date, there has been no action in the Senate regarding Senator
Specter's proposed legislation.230
However, Congressman Robert
"Bobby" Scott, a Democrat from Virginia, introduced his version of the
Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2007, identical to the Senate
bill, to the House on July 12, 2007.231 Moreover, the House Judiciary
Committee, chaired by Michigan Democrat John Conyers, held a
hearing on the subject in August 2007232 and has continued to move the
bill forward to the full House for debate and vote.233
Not only does the Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2007
have bicameral and bipartisan support,234 it also provides a clear solution
to the DOJ's flawed advancement policy by removing the issue
completely from consideration when prosecutors are making their
charging determinations 3 5 Such a policy provides several distinct
advantages over the McNulty Memo's advancement policy.
B. Advantages of the Proposed Legislation
1. Greater Permanency
First, the Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2007, if
adopted by Congress, would create a properly enacted law of the United
States, which can be changed only by subsequent congressional action.
Without legislation, nothing stops the DOJ from reverting back to using
its over-aggressive tactics of the past, including the consideration of
avoid congressional control of the matter. See Sullivan, supra note 157; see also note 160 and
accompanying text.
228. See Patti Waldmeir, US to Ease Corporate Fraud Crackdown, FIN. TIMES (London),
Nov. 18, 2006, at 10 (stating that Senator Specter would continue to seek further changes if
the McNulty Memo did not go far enough).
229. S. 186, 110th Cong. (2007).
230. See 110 Bill Tracking S. 186 (2007); 110 Bill Tracking H.R. 3013 (2007).
231. H.R. 3013, 110th Cong. (2007); see also Johnson, supra note 190.
232. Transcript of House Judiciary Committee Markup of H.R. 3013, The "AttorneyClient Privilege ProtectionAct of 2007," 110th Cong. (2007).
233. See 110 Bill Tracking H.R. 3013 (2007).
234. See supra text accompanying notes 229-33.
235. S. 186, 110th Cong. § 3(b)(2)(B) (2007); H.R. 3013, 110th Cong. § 3(b)(2)(B)
(2007).
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advancement in the charging decision."' Furthermore, permanency in
the policy is an important attribute for business leaders and managers
because they operate in an environment based, in large part, on longterm plans and objectives. As a result, enacting the proposed legislation
will restore consistency relative to the issue of advancement and will
help business leaders structure their operations in the most profitable,
yet law-abiding manner.
2. Binding Effect
In addition to greater permanency, enacting the proposed legislation
would make the prohibition on considering advancement payments in
the charging decision binding law. This is important because, after the
Thompson Memo, it had become "routine" practice for federal
prosecutors to pressure companies into revoking advancement fees for
uncooperative employees or for employees under investigation or
indictment.237
If the Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2007 is enacted,
organizations and their employees can reference legal authority in
refusing to entertain the issue of advancement.
Also, if federal
prosecutors attempt to compel disclosure of issues relating to
advancement, corporate counsel can cite the Act in protest of the
government's request. Therefore, the binding effect of the proposed
legislation will provide greater protections for organizations deciding to
provide advancement payments and for employees expecting to receive
such advancement payments by removing the issue from prosecutorial
consideration, without exception.
3. Application to All U.S. Agents
Finally, the Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2007 applies
to all "agent[s] or attorney[s] of the United States," 8 whereas the
McNulty Memo applies only to the DOJ and the U.S. Attorneys
because it is a DOJ policy memorandum. 29 Therefore, enacting the
proposed legislation will create a broader and more uniform prohibition
against the federal government with regard to the consideration of
advancement of defense costs in the decision to charge organizations.

236.
237.
238.
239.

Jordan, supra note 155; see also supra text accompanying notes 194-99.
Sullivan, supra note 157.
S. 186, 110th Cong. § 3(b) (2007); H.R. 3013, 110th Cong. § 3(b) (2007).
See McNulty Memo, supranote 24; see also supra note 194 and accompanying text.
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C. Congress Should Enact the Advancement Provisionsin the AttorneyClient PrivilegeProtectionAct of 2007
In light of the advantages the Attorney-Client Privilege Protection
Act of 2007 enjoys over the McNulty Memo in relation to
advancement240 and the problems with the McNulty Memo itself, 241 this
Congress should move swiftly to enact the advancement provisions of
the proposed legislation. 242
The proposed legislation provides a
comprehensive framework that fully restores and protects much needed
advancement rights, traditions, and expectations for organizations and
their employees. Although the legislation contains no formal remedy or
enforcement provision, judges are given discretion in devising an
appropriate remedy against any government violation. This allows
substantial flexibility to remedy the harm in each case presented based
on the totality of the circumstances. 3 Consequently, the advancement
provisions in the legislation should be adopted.
V. CONCLUSION

Despite the criticisms from the business and legal communities, the
boldness of Judge Kaplan's decisions in Stein, and the imminent threat
of legislation, the DOJ still has not completely removed the issue of
advancement from prosecutors' considerations when determining the
authenticity of an organization's cooperation in an investigation.
The DOJ had its opportunity to remedy the problem with the
McNulty Memo. Unfortunately, the McNulty Memo breaks little new
ground on the advancement issue and provides only marginally more
effective protections for employees. As a result, the call for legislation
continues. Therefore, Congress should act to restore and protect
employees' access to advancement payments, so they are able to raise an
adequate defense against indictments or investigations that result from

240. See supra Part IV.B.
241. See supra Part III.C.

242. S. 186, 110th Cong. § 3(b)(2)(B) (2007); H.R. 3013, 110th Cong. § 3(b)(2)(B)
(2007).
243. See Podgor, supra note 169. Arguably, flexibility in determining the consequences

for a government violation may be the best option available to the organization, the
government, and the court. Judicial discretion allows penalties for violations to reflect the
harm done. If, for example, the violation is egregious, then the judge could dismiss the case
entirely, like Judge Kaplan did, but if the violation is inconsequential, then the judge is not

required to impose a significant penalty against the government.

A middle-of-the-road

approach could involve a judge ordering that the government cover the costs of individual
defendants harmed by a government violation of the Act.
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their employment.
The Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2007 provides
meaningful and binding protections for employees and organizations
engaged in advancing defense costs. Therefore, this Congress should
enact the proposed legislation, at least in relation to the advancement
provisions, to prohibit the government from interfering unjustifiably
with the rights, traditions, and expectations of organizations and
employees concerning the advancement of defense costs.
JOSHUA K. BYERS

